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COMPELLED SUBSIDIES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
William Baude∗ & Eugene Volokh∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes the government compels people to pay money to organi-
zations they oppose.  A lawyer may be forced to fund a bar association, 
a college student forced to fund student group activities, a public em-
ployee forced to fund a labor union.  Unsurprisingly, people often bristle 
at such compulsion.  People don’t like having their money taken, and 
knowing that it will be spent on causes they oppose seems to add insult 
to injury.  But when is it unconstitutional? 
For over forty years, the Court has unanimously concluded that be-
ing required to pay money to a union, or to a state bar, is a serious 
burden on one’s First Amendment rights.1  This burden, the Court has 
held, is generally unconstitutional when the money is used for most 
kinds of political advocacy.2 
In Janus v. AFSCME,3 a majority of the Court went further and held 
that requiring public employees to pay union agency fees is categorically 
unconstitutional, even when the money is used for collective bargain-
ing.4  Such public-sector collective bargaining, the majority held, is itself 
inherently political.5  And the government interests in mandating such 
payments don’t suffice to justify such requirements.6  There was a 
strong dissent by four Justices, but as we discuss in Part I, we think the 
majority had the better argument on both of these points. 
But we think the majority — and for that matter the dissent, and 
the opinions in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education7 and Keller v. State 
Bar of California8 — erred on the preliminary point.  The better view, 
we think, is that requiring people only to pay money, whether to private 
organizations or to the government, is not a First Amendment problem 
at all.  The employees in Janus were not compelled to speak or to asso-
ciate.  They were compelled to pay, just as we all are compelled to pay 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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 1 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus v. AFSCME, 
Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 2 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36; Keller, 496 U.S. at 14. 
 3 138 S. Ct. 2448. 
 4 See id. at 2486. 
 5 See id. at 2480. 
 6 Id. at 2465–69, 2477–78. 
 7 431 U.S. 209. 
 8 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
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taxes; our having to pay taxes doesn’t violate our First Amendment 
rights, even when the taxes are used for speech we disapprove of — 
likewise with their having to pay agency fees.  If we are right, as we 
argue in Part II, then the result in Janus was wrong. 
In Part III, we turn from evaluating the decision to anticipating its 
consequences.  We doubt Janus will have significant effects on govern-
ment speech rights (section III.A), but it will likely forbid compelled 
funding of other forms of private speech.  Janus will likely extend to a 
prohibition on state bar dues, at least so long as the bar is seen as suffi-
ciently removed from other government agencies (section III.B).  It 
might also lead to constraints on student governments’ use of student 
activity fees at public universities, though universities can create ac-
counting workarounds that will practically allow such student activity 
funding to continue (section III.C). 
Finally, and perhaps most consequentially, Janus may lead to mas-
sive liability for unions that have collected the agency fees that are now 
viewed as unconstitutional (section III.D).  Though the fees were seen 
as valid when collected, the Supreme Court’s precedents say that con-
stitutional reversals in civil cases are generally retroactive, so everyone 
in Janus’s shoes can get agency fee refunds just as Janus himself could 
(at least so long as the statute of limitations has not run).  Moreover, 
private organizations such as unions are generally not entitled to quali-
fied immunity or similar defenses.  While the unions do have some pos-
sible arguments to mitigate the damages or try to claim a special form 
of good faith, those defenses are speculative, and cannot be counted on. 
I.  PAYING IS SPEAKING 
There are two ways of thinking about the constitutionality of com-
pelled payments to others.  One way would view them as a serious bur-
den on First Amendment rights.  The argument goes something like this: 
A law that compels person A to give money to entity B is a compelled 
contribution of money.  Since restricting voluntary contributions of 
money that will be used for speech itself restricts speech,9 compelling 
people to give money that will be used for speech is like compelling 
people to speak themselves.10  And compelling people to speak them-
selves is in turn like restricting their speech11 — maybe even worse.12  
Thus, compelled subsidies raise serious First Amendment problems. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).  
 10 Abood, 431 U.S. at 234–35. 
 11 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977). 
 12 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (“It would seem that involun-
tary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than  
silence.”). 
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A.  The Plausibility of Janus 
Under this framing, the majority opinion in Janus is quite plausible, 
and probably even correct.  In Janus, the Court confronted the consti-
tutionality of so-called “agency shop” laws in the public sector — laws 
that compel state employees to pay for a union to represent them in 
collective bargaining and other “chargeable” activities, even if the em-
ployees did not choose to join it and pay dues.13  Janus, in line with the 
framing above, proceeded under the theory that compelling employees 
to fund a union raised “First Amendment concerns”14 analogous to com-
pelled speech or association. 
If that framing is correct — if such laws raise serious First Amendment 
concerns — then the laws are probably unconstitutional.  To survive 
First Amendment review, such laws would likely need to have a strong 
justification (a “compelling interest”) and need to serve that justification 
better than significantly less restrictive alternatives.15 
It is not clear that there are any truly “compelling” interests in com-
pelling employee support for public sector labor unions.  Twenty-eight 
states do not have any kind of agency fee arrangements for public em-
ployees and instead have a so-called “right to work.”16  That most states 
have chosen to do without them weakens the claim of a “compelling” 
interest, though perhaps not decisively.17 
We also know that a compelling interest to justify compelled speech 
must be “ideologically neutral.”18  In Wooley v. Maynard,19 a famous 
compelled speech case that allowed drivers to tape over the motto on 
their license plates, the Court rejected the state’s interests in “apprecia-
tion of history, individualism, and state pride” as “not ideologically neu-
tral” and concluded that they could not justify compelled private 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460–61. 
 14 Id. at 2464. 
 15 See id. at 2464–65; Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2014); Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 
567 U.S. 298, 309–10, 321–22 (2012). 
 16 Right-to-Work Resources, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZV44-PRVG]. 
 17 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015), for instance, concluded that a prison grooming policy 
failed strict scrutiny under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, in part be-
cause “the vast majority of States and the Federal Government” were content with a less restrictive 
approach.  Id. at 866.  Query whether the same analysis would apply if states were split closer to 
half and half, as was the case in Janus.  See Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 203 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(“That a majority of the States with nonpartisan Supreme Court elections have opted not to censor 
their candidates in [the way challenged in that case] of course does not establish the invalidity of 
the clause, but it does call into question the necessity of implementing Kentucky’s nonpartisan 
judicial election system in this way and whether it amounts to the least restrictive means of pro-
tecting the Commonwealth’s interests.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 18 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). 
 19 430 U.S. 705. 
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speech.20  Public sector unions’ positions — and unionism generally — 
seem to be as ideological as “individualism” or “state pride.” 
In any event, even if one assumes (as the Court in Janus ultimately 
did21) that public sector unions promote compelling state interests, we 
would then look to whether less burdensome means are available.  The 
majority opinion concluded that simply abolishing agency fees will still 
likely serve the government’s interests in labor peace and efficient bar-
gaining just fine.  Labor unions will still have an incentive to represent 
nonmembers, the Court reasoned;22 and some individualized services 
such as grievance representation could be denied to free riders.23 
These predictions were debated by the dissent.24  But there was an 
even stronger argument available to the majority, a less restrictive 
means that would achieve all of the state’s goals and then some: Rather 
than requiring employees to directly pay unions, the state itself could 
instead pay the unions, out of state coffers.  Instead of deducting an 
agency fee from the employee’s paycheck and sending that to the union, 
the state employer could simply reduce the employee’s salary by the 
same amount — with no decrease in take-home pay — and pay that to 
the union as a “labor relations contract fee.”  Indeed, if the state em-
ployer believes that unions provide it valuable services, such as by pro-
moting labor peace, improving employee morale, efficiently handling  
labor-management disputes, and the like, then paying the unions di-
rectly for services rendered would be the logical, normal payment  
mechanism. 
Say, for instance, that state employees get an average of $25,000 a 
year and then must choose whether to pay $600 of it in union dues, or 
$500 in chargeable agency fees.25  Under the agency fee regime, the state 
deducts $500 from each employee’s paycheck (though formally charac-
terizing this as requiring each employee to pay the union $500).  The 
union thus collects $500 for each non-union employee, as well as $600 
for each member.  Under the direct payment alternative, the government 
instead lowers the average wage to $24,500 a year.  Union dues drop to 
$100, and non-union members pay nothing.  The government then gives 
the money directly to the unions.  The unions again collect $500 for each 
non-union employee, as well as $600 for each dues-paying member.  And 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 Id. at 716–17. 
 21 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. 
 22 Id. at 2467.  
 23 Id. at 2468–69. 
 24 Id. at 2490–91 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 25 These are rounded approximations of the numbers in Janus.  See id. at 2461 (majority opin-
ion); Joint Appendix at 332, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466). 
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the employees continue to get the same net salaries as under the old 
system.26 
This alternative is revenue neutral for the state, so it avoids the ques-
tions confronted in cases like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,27 
such as when the government must “assume the cost” of a new program 
under least-restrictive-means analysis.28  And it accomplishes everything 
legitimate that agency fees accomplished — funding the desired activi-
ties of public sector unions and avoiding free riding without (on net) 
costing either the state or state employees a nickel.  The majority does 
not mention this alternative; but we think it would be constitutionally 
permissible, and an adequate means for serving the government interest. 
Now, some people (including us) have argued that the presence of 
such alternatives should be a clue that there is nothing unconstitutional 
about the agency fee arrangement and other compelled subsidies.29  But 
it could cut the other way: if we accept the premise that compelled sub-
sidies do work a serious First Amendment injury, then the availability 
of this direct payment alternative just proves that it is an injury that is 
wholly unnecessary to inflict, and therefore wholly unjustified.30 
It is also true that there would be some transition costs in moving 
from one regime to the other, and the details would vary by state.  In 
some states the alternative would require legislative change, in others 
apparently not.31  But it seems unlikely that threatened transition costs 
alone would be enough to make the program constitutional; at most they 
would come into the consideration of stare decisis, which we won’t dis-
cuss here, fascinating though it is. 
B.  Janus Under Employee Speech Doctrine 
Now, perhaps, even if we accept that compelled funding is compelled 
speech, it would be subject to lesser scrutiny in the particular context of 
government employment, where the Court has recognized that govern-
ment employers have broader powers over employee speech than they 
would over ordinary citizens. 
But even in the public employment context, this kind of compelled 
speech (if that’s what it is) would be difficult to uphold.  The closest 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 Actually, because of the federal tax treatment of union dues, they may get slightly net higher 
salaries.  See Daniel Hemel & David Louk, Is Abood Irrelevant?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 
227, 236–37 (2015).  
 27 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 28 Id. at 2780–81. 
 29 Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh and William Baude as Amici Curiae in Support of  
Respondents at 12, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466); Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the 
First Amendment, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1046, 1077 n.165 (2018). 
 30 See Aaron Tang, Public Sector Unions, the First Amendment, and the Costs of Collective 
Bargaining, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 197–204 (2016). 
 31 Hemel & Louk, supra note 26, at 248–49. 
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precedents may well be the Supreme Court’s “political patronage” cases, 
which protect almost all public employees from being required to join, 
endorse, or contribute to a political party.32  Such requirements “severely 
restrict political belief and association,” and cannot be justified under 
strict scrutiny.33 
While the government has undoubted power to discharge and disci-
pline its government employees, the patronage cases nonetheless con-
clude that an employee’s job with the government “cannot properly be 
conditioned upon his allegiance to [a] political party.”34  Indeed, the plu-
rality in Elrod v. Burns35 expressly noted that “any assessment of [the 
employee’s] salary is tantamount to coerced belief.”36 
It has long been argued that public sector labor unions are also “in-
herently ‘political’”37 — even if one excludes their “nonchargeable” ac-
tivities — and the choices that they lobby the government to make are 
of great public importance.38  Compelling employees to endorse or ex-
pressly join unions would thus be as unconstitutional as compelling 
them to endorse or join political parties.  And if one accepts that com-
pelled contributions are comparable to compelled speech or compelled 
membership, then they would likely be unconstitutional as well — jus-
tifiable only if they pass strict scrutiny, which (as discussed above) would 
be very difficult to do. 
Even if we ignore the patronage cases and employ the laxer standard 
of Pickering v. Board of Education,39 compelled expression in support 
of unions is still likely unconstitutional.  Under the Pickering frame-
work, speech on a matter of public concern40 (and not part of one’s of-
ficial job duties41) can be restricted only if “the interest of the State, as 
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees” outweighs “the interests of the [employee], 
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern.”42 
The test is not quite framed for compulsions of payment; it was de-
signed for restrictions on speech.  But if we apply it, both threshold 
conditions appear to be met.  Supporting a union is not exactly what 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 See Tang, supra note 30, at 152–53.  The exception is for narrow job categories where political 
affiliation is seen as an important job criterion, for instance high-level decisionmakers.  See Branti 
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517–18 (1980). 
 33 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Branti, 445 U.S. at 515–
16. 
 34 Branti, 445 U.S. at 519; see also Elrod, 427 U.S. at 355 (plurality opinion). 
 35 427 U.S. 347. 
 36 Id. at 355 (plurality opinion). 
 37 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226 (1977) (characterizing appellants’ argument). 
 38 See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474–77. 
 39 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 40 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004). 
 41 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
 42 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
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state employees are “employed to do,” nor are their communications to 
the union “official communications” or “official business.”43  As for “pub-
lic concern,” public sector unions negotiate over many big-ticket issues 
that affect government budgets and important government policies,44 as 
well as individual grievances that are sometimes of private concern and 
sometimes not.45  But the question is how to characterize compelled 
support for the union itself.  We could either try to split support for a 
union into its “private concern” and “public concern” portions — a split 
that would place a lot in the “public concern” category, given the public 
significance of union actions — or we could conclude that all decisions 
to support or not support a union are matters of public concern if they 
relate in part to the big-ticket issues.  And to the extent that these thresh-
old tests are met, agency fees would likely fail the balancing test in light 
of the direct payment alternative. 
Perhaps for these reasons, the dissent in Janus tried to argue that 
something even weaker than Pickering was the law: “If an employee’s 
speech is about, in, and directed to the workplace, she has no possibility 
of a First Amendment claim.”46  And elsewhere the dissent argued that 
the “public concern” test from Pickering47 “is not, as the majority seems 
to think, whether the public is, or should be, interested in a government 
employee’s speech.  Instead, the question is whether that speech is about 
and directed to the workplace — as contrasted with the broader public 
square.”48 
But this overstates the government’s power under the employee 
speech doctrine.  In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School  
District,49 the Court concluded that the First Amendment protected 
speech by a schoolteacher to a principal (i.e., directed to someone in the 
workplace),50 at school (in the workplace),51 about alleged race discrim-
ination in the school (about the workplace).52  The Court specifically 
rejected the school district’s claim that First Amendment protection “is 
lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with 
his employer rather than to spread his views before the public.”53 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–23. 
 44 See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474–77. 
 45 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).  
 46 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2496 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 47 391 U.S. at 569–73. 
 48 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2495 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 49 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
 50 Id. at 411–13. 
 51 Ayers v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1313 (5th Cir. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Givhan, 
439 U.S. 410. 
 52 Givhan, 439 U.S. at 412–13. 
 53 Id. at 415–16. 
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Likewise, in Connick v. Myers,54 the Court concluded that speech by 
an employee to coworkers, at work, about alleged “pressure[] to work in 
political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates” was on a 
matter of public concern.55  The Connick Court concluded that the 
speech could still be restricted on the facts of that particular case, be-
cause it was sufficiently disruptive to fail the Pickering test — but the 
Court deliberately did not conclude that such in-, to-, and about-work-
place speech was categorically unprotected.56 
So whether seen through the general lens of compelled speech or the 
specific lens of government employee speech, it is hard to justify the 
First Amendment harms supposedly inflicted by agency fees. 
C.  Janus’s Widely Accepted Premise 
Many thoughtful people have taken this general view — that com-
pelled subsidies for speech raise serious First Amendment problems — 
even if they have quibbled over its scope.  It was the approach taken by 
nearly every Justice in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.57  It was 
unanimously extended to state bar associations in Keller v. State Bar of 
California, thirteen years later.58  Before all that, it was forcefully argued 
by both Justices Black59 and Douglas60 — who were certainly not right 
about everything in their day, but who were sometimes visionary.61  
Without explicitly putting it in First Amendment terms, a 1943 ACLU-
proposed “‘bill of rights’ for union members”62 likewise argued that “no 
[union] member should be assessed for a political purpose which he does 
not support.”63 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 55 Id. at 149. 
 56 Id. at 164. 
 57 431 U.S. 209, 222, 236 (1977); id. at 244 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).  Then-Justice 
Rehnquist reiterated his view that the First Amendment protections for government employees 
were weak and that the patronage cases were wrongly decided, but joined the majority anyway.  
Id. at 242–44 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 58 496 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1990). 
 59 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 871 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists 
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788–89 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 60 Street, 367 U.S. at 776–78 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 61 The underlying argument traces at least as far back as Cecil B. DeMille’s 1944 California 
challenge to use of union dues for political purposes.  Appellant’s Opening Brief at 33–35, De Mille 
v. Am. Fed’n of Radio Artists, Civ. 15067, 175 P.2d 851 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947), aff’d, 187 P.2d 
769 (Cal. 1947). 
 62 ACLU, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS 68 (1943) (capitalization omitted). 
 63 Id. at 70; see also id. (“[I]f for political purposes the assessments should be wholly voluntary.”); 
id. at 67 (asserting “the right of the minority not to be assessed” when unions “contribute funds to 
political campaigns”).  This proposal dealt with dues at private workplaces, id. at 66, not govern-
mental ones (since public employees were generally not allowed to collectively bargain at the time, 
see Developments in the Law — Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1676–77 (1984)); it 
also called for “every possible pressure . . . exerted from within and without the labor movement to 
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Even the dissent in Janus — which adopted a generally barn- 
burning rhetorical approach — never really disputed this general view 
of compelled subsidies as compelled speech.  The dissent recites, without 
disapproval, Abood’s concession of employee “First Amendment inter-
ests.”64  It then goes on to battle about the strength of the government’s 
interests and the scope of employees’ free speech rights without ever 
really denying that there are serious free speech rights at issue in the 
first place.65  Scholars who challenge the Court’s compelled subsidy ju-
risprudence as incoherent or overbroad likewise often concede this view 
in at least some measure, for instance arguing (1) that the subsidies 
might be unconstitutional if they make it look like the subsidizers en-
dorse the speech,66 (2) that there is a symmetry between the right to 
contribute money and the right not to contribute,67 or (3) that compelled 
subsidies “might work some infringement of freedom of conscience” 
(though “slight”).68   
The majority opinion in Janus has been and will be subjected to 
quite strong critiques, not just as to its merits but as to its methodolog-
ical legitimacy: some argue that the Justices are unprincipled hacks  
who only profess to care about text and history when it suits them,69 
that they are reviving Lochner to constitutionalize libertarian economic 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
induce unions to measure up to such standards,” but only pressures short of legislation, ACLU, 
supra note 62, at 68–69.  See also Clyde W. Summers, Union Powers and Workers’ Rights, 49 MICH. 
L. REV. 805, 835–36 (1951) (concluding that “compulsory contribution to political causes” was “[a] 
private poll tax” that was “difficult to justify”). 
 64 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2489 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 
U.S. 209, 222 (1977)). 
 65 The dissent did cite our amicus brief, which challenged this premise, but without endorsing 
or fully describing this part of our argument.  See id. at 2494–95. 
 66 Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 
2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 218–20; see also David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against 
Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995, 1019–20 (1982) (allowing 
this possibility, though arguing it is unlikely in the agency fee context). 
 67 Post, supra note 66, at 221–25; see also Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 26 (2016) (“The better reading of the decision . . . is that Abood is the mirror image 
of Buckley.”). 
 68 Gaebler, supra note 66, at 1022; see also David Luban, The Disengagement of the Legal Pro-
fession: Keller v. State Bar of California, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 185, 187 (arguing that because 
“the actual amounts of money levied are rather small” the First Amendment interests are easily 
outweighed by “unionism, which has been one of the mainstays of American society for over a 
century”). 
 69 Andrew Strom, In Janus, the Court’s “Originalists” Show Their True Colors, ON LABOR  
(June 29, 2018), https://onlabor.org/in-janus-the-courts-originalists-show-their-true-colors/ [https:// 
perma.cc/86XJ-PBF5]. 
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principles,70 that they are “weaponizing the First Amendment” (what-
ever precisely that might mean),71 and that they are “black-robed rulers 
overriding citizens’ choices” at “every stop.”72  We think Janus is wrong 
too, as we will explain, but this kind of criticism is both unfair and 
insufficiently ambitious.  The majority’s argument proceeds quite logi-
cally from a widely held and plausible premise about First Amendment 
compelled speech.  The case for the agency fees was lost when that 
premise was accepted. 
II.  PAYING IS NOT SPEAKING 
So if requiring someone “to contribute to the support of an ideologi-
cal cause” (even just by paying money) interferes with “the freedom of 
belief”73 protected by the First Amendment, then the Janus majority 
was likely right: Abood would have been correct to recognize such a 
right, and then wrong not to protect that right more fully.  Janus is more 
convincing than Abood in recognizing that collective bargaining — at 
least for government employee unions bargaining with government of-
ficials over public funds — is “an ideological cause” that involves “a 
political message”74 as well. 
But there is another way to think about compulsory funding, one we 
think is ultimately correct.  Requiring someone to pay money is not re-
quiring them to believe, to speak, or to associate, even if the money is 
spent for political purposes.  By itself, it does not implicate the First 
Amendment, and does not require the government to try to use less re-
strictive alternatives.  This means that Abood erred at its root, in recog-
nizing such a right at all. 
A.  The Ubiquity of Compulsory Funding of Ideological Expression 
Requiring people to pay money that can be used for speech with 
which they disagree is utterly commonplace.  If “to compel a man to 
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which 
he disbelieves and abhor[s] is sinful and tyrannical,”75 then it’s sin and 
tyranny that are everywhere in modern government.  After all, each of 
us must pay taxes that will in part go to spread opinions many of us 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 70 Mark Joseph Stern, A New Lochner Era, SLATE (June 29, 2018, 4:01 PM), https://slate. 
com/news-and-politics/2018/06/the-lochner-era-is-set-for-a-comeback-at-the-supreme-court.html 
[https://perma.cc/G9FP-WCKL]. 
 71 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 72 Id. at 2502. 
 73 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977). 
 74 Id. at 234. 
 75 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Free-
dom, in 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J. Boyd ed., 1950) (emphasis omitted)). 
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disbelieve and abhor — military recruiting campaigns, antidrug cam-
paigns, publicity for or against abortion or contraception, public school 
and university curricula, and a vast range of other messages.76 
Justice Black in Lathrop v. Donohue77 insisted that he could “think 
of few plainer, more direct abridgments of the freedoms of the First 
Amendment than to compel persons to support,” among other things, 
“ideologies or causes that they are against.”78  In a companion case,  
International Association of Machinists v. Street,79 he condemned a law 
“being used as a means to exact money from . . . employees . . . to sup-
port doctrines they are against.”80  But he never explained how this vi-
sion was consistent with the everyday reality of “exact[ion]” through tax-
ation to support ideologies, causes, and doctrines — whether related to 
tolerance, drugs, alcohol, crime, war, the environment, respect for the 
law, or anything else — that some taxpayers “are against.” 
The government cannot require us to say things as part of its pro-
grams.  It generally cannot require us to display things on our property81 
(except when it can82).  But it can certainly require us to pay for speech 
by others.  You can refuse to say the Pledge of Allegiance, but you can’t 
require the government to refund the portion of your taxes that it spends 
on patriotic observances. 
Perhaps because of this, the Court in Janus (unlike Justice Black) 
was careful to condemn only “compelled subsidization of private 
speech.”83  And in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n84 and Board of 
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth,85 the 
Court expressly made clear that the logic of Abood and similar cases 
doesn’t apply to compelled funding of government speech.86 
But having recognized that government speech can be funded by 
taxes, we should have doubts about the Abood First Amendment argu-
ment in the first place.  Why would the First Amendment distinguish 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 76 Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in 
Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3, 22–24 (1983); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Link 
Between Student Activity Fees and Campaign Finance Regulations, 33 IND. L. REV. 435, 453–54 
(2000); Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled Subsidization, 
38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1111–17 (2005). 
 77 367 U.S. 820 (1961). 
 78 Id. at 873 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 79 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
 80 Id. at 790 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 81 See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376, 2378 (2018) 
(holding that California could not require crisis pregnancy centers to post certain disclosures). 
 82 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 58–70 (2006) 
(holding that Congress could require law schools to distribute information about where students 
can find on-campus military recruiters). 
 83 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (emphasis added). 
 84 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
 85 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 86 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559; Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229. 
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compelling people to subsidize private speech from compelling people 
to subsidize government speech?  If compelled subsidy of private speech 
somehow “undermines” “the search for truth,”87 the much larger com-
pelled subsidy of government speech would do so at least as much.  If 
compelling people to subsidize private speakers’ ideas is “demeaning” 
and “coerc[es them] into betraying their convictions,”88 then compelling 
people to subsidize the government’s ideas is just as bad.  That we ac-
cept such government compulsion without any constitutional qualm 
suggests that compulsion to pay money, by itself, is not a constitutional 
problem at all.89 
In Abood, Justice Powell opined that compelled payment for speech 
“of a private association is fundamentally different” from compelled 
payment for government speech, because “the government is representa-
tive of the people,” while the private association “is representative only 
of one segment of the population, with certain common interests.”90  But 
why should it matter that “the government is representative of the peo-
ple”?  The First Amendment protects against majoritarian speech com-
pulsions as much as against speech compulsions that favor one segment 
of the population. 
We don’t say, for instance, “requiring schoolchildren to say a pledge 
of allegiance would be unconstitutional if the government delegated the 
writing of a pledge to the Boy Scouts, but if the requirement is imposed 
by a representative legislature, it’s just fine.”  If compelled payment is 
just as bad as compelled speech, then why should the presence of dem-
ocratic decisionmaking — generally so inadequate to justify speech com-
pulsions — legitimize compelled payments? 
In Southworth, the Court likewise suggested that compulsory fund-
ing of government speech could be justified by the presence of “tradi-
tional political controls to ensure responsible government action” that 
might be “sufficient to overcome First Amendment objections.”91  But 
the First Amendment isn’t limited to preventing “[ir]responsible govern-
ment action.”  The premise of the compelled subsidy cases is that re-
quiring people to fund speech that they oppose unduly interferes with 
their dignity and autonomy, not that the government may use people’s 
money irresponsibly. 
Indeed, consider the public employment contract negotiation itself.  
Some employees may disapprove of the position being taken by a union 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 87 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 88 Id. 
 89 We also think the Court will continue to accept the compulsion without constitutional qualm 
even after Janus.  See infra section III.A, pp. 195–96. 
 90 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the 
judgment); see also Post, supra note 66, at 225 (offering a similar analysis).  
 91 529 U.S. at 229. 
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using their agency fees.  But many employees may disapprove of the 
position being taken by management using their tax dollars.  If compul-
sory agency fees are allowed, compulsory payments are being used to 
fund both sides of the negotiation.  There is no First Amendment prob-
lem with the management negotiators speaking using compulsorily 
raised funds.  Why should there be a First Amendment problem with 
the union negotiators speaking using compulsorily raised funds?92 
Compulsory tax revenue also routinely ends up subsidizing private 
speech.  Tax money funds private artists (through National Endowment 
for the Arts grants), private scientists (through National Science Foun-
dation grants), public university professors writing law review articles 
(through faculty salaries), and much more.  All that speech may well 
express private opinions that many taxpayers might reject; yet there is 
no First Amendment problem with tax money being used this way.93  
And if one defends such funding on the grounds that the funding to the 
private speakers is still authorized by “the government[, which] is rep-
resentative of the people” — well, the same is true of agency fees. 
Another possible distinction is that most taxes go to a wide range of 
uses, and come from a wide range of taxpayers; agency fees are narrower 
in both respects.  But we think the Court was quite right in Johanns to 
conclude that this distinction can’t make a First Amendment difference. 
In Johanns, the Court upheld a program in which the government 
used money raised through “a targeted assessment on beef producers, 
rather than by general revenues” to pay for generic beef advertising.94  
“The compelled-subsidy analysis,” the Court held, “is altogether unaf-
fected by whether the funds for the promotions are raised by general 
taxes or through a targeted assessment.”95  “The First Amendment does 
not confer a right to pay one’s taxes into the general fund, because the 
injury of compelled funding . . . does not stem from the Government’s 
mode of accounting.”96  We agree: there is no reason the government 
should have less freedom to use, say, revenues from an excise tax on 
alcohol or gasoline than revenues from a general income tax, property 
tax, or sales tax.97 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 92 We express no opinion on the policy arguments for why one side should be funded this way 
and the other should not.  But we see no good argument that the First Amendment allows compul-
sorily raised funds to be used by one side but not the other. 
 93 Perhaps some such grants might include conditions limiting the use of the funds for certain 
political purposes, such as electioneering or lobbying.  But such conditions are surely not required 
by the First Amendment, even when they are allowed by it, and in any event they leave grant 
recipients free to express many controversial but not election- or legislation-related opinions. 
 94 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005). 
 95 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 96 Id. at 562–63. 
 97 If the tax itself discriminates against speech based on its content, or targets those with disfa-
vored views, it would be unconstitutional on those grounds.  Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 
481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).  But normal, content-
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Nor can the First Amendment analysis reasonably turn on the nar-
rowness of the purposes for which the tax is collected.98  For instance, 
the nation is full of special-purpose districts that receive specially tar-
geted property tax revenue: school districts, business improvement dis-
tricts, public library districts, hospital districts, mosquito control dis-
tricts, and many more.  There is no reason why they should be more 
constrained by the First Amendment than are cities, counties, states, or 
the federal government.  Whatever injury there might be — none, we 
think — to a taxpayer whose money is spent to buy library books he 
disapproves of, that injury is the same whether the books are paid for 
by general income tax funds or by a property tax imposed on behalf of 
a special library district.99  Likewise with special assessments to pay for 
union negotiations or for bar programs. 
B.  The Irrelevance of Cutting Out the Government Middleman 
Now many of the examples we gave involve money being taken from 
objectors, placed in the treasury, and then sent to private recipients.  
Agency fees, by contrast, at least formally flow from the objecting em-
ployees directly to the private union.  Yet even this formal difference is 
thin — both agency fees and taxes are usually withheld from one’s 
paycheck and then routed by the government to the objectionable use. 
And, more broadly, why should this formal difference matter?  One 
way or the other, objectors are required to fund speech they dislike.  
That the government adds an extra step, where the government puts 
the money in the treasury after taking it and before transferring it, 
should not have First Amendment significance.  Sometimes formal dif-
ferences do matter in law — but usually they are significant for a reason, 
whether practical, textual, or historical.  As we’ve discussed, there is no 
practical ground for a distinction between agency fees and taxes, nor is 
there anything in the text of the First Amendment that suggests one. 
The Court in Abood, Janus, and many other cases has vaguely hinted 
at a historical argument, citing Jefferson’s objection “to compel[ling] a 
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions 
which he disbelieves and abhors.”100  But in that quote Jefferson was 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
neutral taxes cannot be invalidated on the grounds that they pay for speech that the taxpayers 
dislike.  Ark. Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 229. 
 98 See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77 
TUL. L. REV. 163, 189 (2002) (“The objection in Keller and Abood — that a single recipient used 
dues to advance its own causes — is absent in the taxpayer situation, where general taxpayer funds 
are used for a wide array of government speech purposes.”). 
 99 See, e.g., Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 88-21 (May 26, 1988) (discussing library taxing districts). 
 100 Jefferson, supra note 75 (emphasis omitted).  Janus cited two additional historical sources, 138 
S. Ct. at 2471 n.8, which did not discuss funding but simply criticized religious tests, oaths of alle-
giance, and the like.  Oliver Ellsworth, The Landholder, VII., CONN. COURANT, Dec. 17, 1787, 
reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 167, 167–71 (Paul 
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specifically talking about the propagation of religious opinions,101 which 
is regulated by a separate constitutional provision — the Establishment 
Clause.  And indeed, Establishment Clause precedent further proves our 
point.  Precedent forbids the government from requiring us to tithe to a 
church.102  Yet it equally bars the government from selectively targeting 
churches for gifts of tax funds as well.103  So the historical references 
provide no particular support for the Court’s distinction between com-
pelled direct payments and compelled payments that go through the 
treasury. 
Some people have defended the formal distinction by saying that co-
ercively funded government speech is inevitable, but at least coercive 
funding of private speech is not.  And we do appreciate that constitu-
tional rights shouldn’t be entirely rejected simply because they can’t be 
completely protected.  But the inevitability of coercively funded govern-
ment speech should serve as a clue that coercively funded private speech 
is not unconstitutional either. 
This is especially so because coercion for government speech is so 
common and so substantial.  Average agency fee payers likely pay about 
2% of their wages in agency fees,104 but the average tax burden (federal, 
state, and local) is about 25%.105  Much of those tax payments will go 
to activities that have at least as “powerful political and civic conse-
quences”106 as the activities paid for by agency fees.  Yet we see no Free 
Speech Clause problems with those massive compelled payments for, 
among other things, speech; it’s not just that we view this as deeply 
regrettable but inevitable — the legal system views taxes as raising no 
Free Speech Clause objections at all, whether the taxes go to speech or 
anything else.107  That should make us doubt that there are First 
Amendment problems with the much smaller compelled agency fees. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Leicester Ford ed., Historical Printing Club 1892); NOAH WEBSTER, On Test Laws, Oaths of Alle-
giance and Abjuration, and Partial Exclusions from Office, in A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND 
FUGITIV WRITINGS 151, 151–53 (Boston, I. Thomas & E.T. Andrews 1790). 
 101 The quote was from his bill on religious freedom, and condemned fees that were used to 
support religious teaching.  Jefferson, supra note 75; see also David Luban, Taking out the Adver-
sary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 235 (2003) (simi-
larly criticizing use of this Jefferson quote); Klass, supra note 76, at 1114. 
 102 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1947). 
 103 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995). 
 104 Sachs, supra note 29, at 1048. 
 105 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REVENUE STATISTICS 2017 — THE  
UNITED STATES (2017), https://www.oecd.org/tax/revenue-statistics-united-states.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3XJ5-PFHZ]. 
 106 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012)). 
 107 Of course, some people morally object to taxation generally, or to taxation used for particular 
purposes.  But in our experience, they rarely distinguish taxes spent on speech from taxes spent on 
other behavior — and the legal system certainly does not. 
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Sometimes formal distinctions at least accomplish something sym-
bolic, but we do not see that here either.  Paying agency fees could be 
seen by some as complicity in the actions that the union engages in using 
those fees.  But of course the same is routinely perceived by many when 
it comes to taxes: “It is not a man’s duty . . . to devote himself to the 
eradication of . . . even the most enormous wrong,” Thoreau wrote, “but 
it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and . . . not to give it 
practically his support” through the payment of taxes.108 
Conversely, one could say that no one would reasonably view paying 
taxes as endorsement of the government’s actions, precisely because eve-
ryone understands that people pay taxes because they have to.  Yet ex-
actly the same is true of agency fees.109  However we think about com-
plicity in these contexts, we see no symbolic difference between 
government coercion to pay money to others and government coercion 
to pay money to the government so it can be paid to others (whether 
government employees or recipients of government grants). 
To be sure, the government spends money on more things than un-
ions do (though unions spend it on many things, too).  Some might there-
fore think that paying money to a government that is fighting a war 
does not symbolize support for the war, but paying money to a union 
symbolizes support for the union’s collective bargaining positions.  But 
from 1942 to 1945 and from 1951 to 1961, the federal government spent 
the majority of its outlays on the military.110  Likewise, some local prop-
erty taxes are specifically targeted to schools, which are chock full of 
government speech that many people might deeply oppose. 
More broadly, even if most people today don’t see compelled funding 
of the federal government as symbolically expressing support of (say) 
the War on Terror, surely the funding symbolically expresses support of 
the federal government as an institution at least as much as compelled 
agency fees symbolically express support of unions.  Yet we do not per-
ceive being forced to pay taxes as burdening people’s First Amendment 
rights, even if they oppose the federal government as a whole (whether 
because they think that it is particularly evil, or because they think all 
government is evil).  And this is so regardless of the symbolism they or 
others may perceive from such a forced payment.  The same should be 
so for public employees being forced to pay agency fees. 
So there seems to be no adequate reason — textual, historical, prac-
tical, or symbolic — for treating compelled payments differently depend-
ing on whether they pass through the treasury.  And we can see this by 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 108 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, A YANKEE IN CANADA 131 (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1866). 
 109 See Gaebler, supra note 66. 
 110 “National defense” expenditure as a percentage of all outlays was over 70% throughout  
America’s World War II years, nearly 90% in 1945, and nearly 70% from 1952 to 1954.  See  
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLE 3.1 — OUTLAYS BY SUPERFUNCTION 
AND FUNCTION: 1940–2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/ [https://perma.cc/ 
49K3-XT6F]. 
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considering the many situations where the government requires people 
to buy goods or services from private organizations, even though those 
organizations can then use some of this compulsorily provided revenue 
to express their views on whatever topics they please. 
For instance, a public law school might require that applicants take 
the LSAT, which would require them to pay money to the Law School 
Admission Council.  LSAC uses some of that money for speech, includ-
ing research reports and public statements that many might see as im-
bued with ideological messages.111  And if the whole process of public 
employee collective bargaining can itself be viewed as political, then the 
LSAC’s entire mission — of measuring the future operators of the legal 
system in particular ways, with an eye toward particular judgments of 
quality and merit — can be seen as political, too.  Yet there’s no First 
Amendment problem with requiring public law school applicants to pay 
the money to LSAC.  Nor would applicants likely care whether they  
had to pay the LSAC directly, or had to pay (say) the Department of  
Education, which would then subcontract the task to LSAC. 
Likewise, there’s no First Amendment problem with requiring driv-
ers to pay money to auto insurance companies, requiring public univer-
sity students to buy Apple computers,112 or requiring litigants to pay 
opponents’ legal fees.113  The companies might well spend some of their 
profits on lobbying, ideological advocacy, and even outright electioneer-
ing.  But that compelled payment is not compelled speech.  For the same 
reason, there’s no First Amendment problem with requiring employees 
to buy the services of a union, whether or not they like how their money 
is spent. 
C.  Nothing New, from 1947 to Today 
There is nothing fundamentally new in our position: Justices  
Frankfurter and Harlan took much the same view nearly fifty years ago, 
when they argued that agency fees for railroad employees (Machinists 
v. Street) and mandatory bar dues for lawyers (Lathrop v. Donohue) 
didn’t violate the First Amendment.  In such situations, they reasoned, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 111 See Research Library, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, https://www.lsac.org/data- 
research/research [https://perma.cc/SE75-BM8X] (listing reports on, among other things, perfor-
mance by race, sex, and ethnicity); LSAC Diversity Matters Grants, LAW SCH. ADMISSION  
COUNCIL, https://www.lsac.org/members/lsac-grant-programs/lsac-diversity-matters-grants 
[https://perma.cc/AZ7L-6J72] (promoting various grants for, among other things, “diversity out-
reach efforts”). 
 112 See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Student Laptop Computer Requirement, UNIV.  
OF CINCINNATI BLUE ASH COLL. (June 23, 2017), http://www.ucblueash.edu/content/dam/ 
ucblueash/docs/academics/academic-departments/emedia/2017-Laptop-FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
EUB5-J28X]. 
 113 Banning v. Newdow, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447, 453 (Ct. App. 2004); Post, supra note 66, at 210–
12 (discussing this example and offering others). 
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No one’s desire or power to speak his mind is checked or curbed.  The 
individual member may express his views in any public or private forum as 
freely as he could before the union collected his dues . . . . 
 . . . .  
  . . . It is a commonplace of all organizations that a minority of a legally 
recognized group may at times see an organization’s funds used for promo-
tion of ideas opposed by the minority . . . . [For example,] the Federal  
Government expends revenue collected from individual taxpayers to prop-
agandize ideas which many taxpayers oppose.114 
And indeed this position goes back still fifteen years more, to De 
Mille v. American Federation of Radio Artists,115 a 1947 California  
Supreme Court case.  The plaintiff was the great director Cecil B. 
DeMille, who was also a prominent political opponent of the labor 
movement.  DeMille had a radio program, the Lux Radio Theatre, 
which required him to be a member of a union.  The union assessed all 
members a $1 fee that was used to oppose a California right-to-work 
ballot measure.  DeMille refused to pay, which got him ejected from the 
union and lost him his $100,000 per year salary.116 
DeMille sued, claiming this violated his First Amendment rights.  
Unlike in Abood and Janus, there was no state action present: the $1 
assessment was imposed and enforced just by the union.  But the court 
didn’t focus on the absence of state action, and instead squarely con-
fronted the compelled speech argument.   
DeMille had argued the $1 compelled payment “would be an expres-
sion on his part contrary to his personal beliefs,”117 which he argued was 
unconstitutional under West Virginia State Board of Education v.  
Barnette.118  The court disagreed, noting that Barnette had not con-
cerned “payment of taxes assessed for the support of school districts re-
quiring flag salute ceremonies”; had that been the issue in Barnette, the 
court opined, “we doubt that the disposition would have been the 
same.”119  And the court held that there was no right to be exempted 
from such assessments, “else payment of a tax . . . could be avoided by 
the mere assertion of beliefs . . . opposed to the accomplishment 
thereof.”120 
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 114 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 806, 808 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); 
accord Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 856–57 (1961) (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in the judgment); see also Post, supra note 66, at 210–12 (giving other examples). 
 115 187 P.2d 769 (Cal. 1947). 
 116 De Mille v. Am. Fed’n of Radio Artists, 175 P.2d 851, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946), aff’d, 187 P.2d 
769. 
 117 De Mille, 187 P.2d at 775. 
 118 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 119 De Mille, 187 P.2d at 775 (emphasis added). 
 120 Id. at 776. 
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This earlier view was right, we think, and Abood (and perhaps 
Street) started us down a mistaken path — a path that leads logically to 
Janus.  True, much of what public employee unions do is political.  Some 
involves overtly ideological advocacy.  Much involves at least taking 
bargaining positions “that have powerful political and civic conse-
quences.”121  But much of what government does is political, too. 
The First Amendment does not protect us from having our money 
forcibly taken — on threat of prison — to pay for governmental expres-
sion that we disagree with.  Why then should it protect us from having 
our money forcibly taken — on threat of being fired — to pay for union 
expression that we disagree with?  These are simply the consequences 
of sharing a nation or a workplace with people who disagree with us. 
D.  Isn’t Money Speech? 
Abood relied in part on an analogy to campaign finance law.  Buckley 
v. Valeo,122 the Court noted, held “that contributing to an organization 
for the purpose of spreading a political message is protected by the First 
Amendment”;123 and the Court concluded that, when it comes to agency 
fees, “[t]he fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than 
prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes works no 
less an infringement of their constitutional rights.”124  This analogy, we 
think, is misplaced. 
Money is not speech, but restricting us from spending money to 
speak restricts our speech — it makes it impossible for us to put up a 
billboard, buy a newspaper ad, and the like.125  Likewise, restricting 
newspapers from spending money to publish would restrict their free 
press rights; restricting parents from spending money to educate their 
children would restrict their parental rights; restricting people from 
spending money on abortions would restrict their abortion rights; re-
stricting criminal defendants from spending money on lawyers would 
restrict their right to the assistance of counsel.126 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 121 Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012). 
 122 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 123 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. 1). 
 124 Id. 
 125 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 338–41 (2010); Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; see also Nixon 
v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[A] decision to contrib-
ute money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern — not because money is speech 
(it is not); but because it enables speech.”); Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United 
as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 421 (2013).  We think the Court’s approach to campaign 
finance speech restrictions is basically right.  See Eugene Volokh, Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Basically 
Right, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1095, 1101 (2002). 
 126 See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 415–16 (1988) (Stevens, J., writing for a unanimous 
Court) (holding that the Free Speech Clause includes the right to pay people to circulate initiative 
petitions); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) (noting that “the 
  
190 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 132:171 
But compelling us to give money does not appreciably restrict our 
speech, other than by slightly reducing the amount of money we have 
left over.  Nor does compelling us to give money, without compelling us 
to do more, compel us to speak or to believe.  That is why the govern-
ment can compel each of us to pay money to the treasury every year 
even though it cannot require any of us to pledge allegiance to the gov-
ernment.127  No court would accept a challenge to a state property tax 
on the grounds that it was equivalent to a pledge of allegiance to the 
state or its school system, nor on the grounds that it left property owners 
with less money to spend on billboards.128  That is because compelled 
payment is neither compelled speech nor a speech restriction. 
In Buckley, the Court did hold that the very act of contributing 
money to a political cause can be symbolic expression, so restricting con-
tributions restricts that symbolic expression and not just the recipient’s 
ability to spend the money for speech.129  But the Court gave little 
weight to this contributor interest in symbolic expression, and upheld 
the limits on contributions.130  And whatever symbolism there might be 
in voluntary political contributions, it would disappear for government-
compelled payments, as shown by the countless exactions the legal sys-
tem accepts without qualm.131 
Now when it comes to religious exemption claims, such as under a 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (state or federal), the analysis is dif-
ferent: requirements that people pay money — including for taxes — 
may indeed count as a “substantial burden” on religious objectors.132  
The objectors might still often be denied an exemption from such  
requirements, on the theory that uniform administration of a tax  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Government [does not] deny that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be 
represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire”). 
 127 See Gaebler, supra note 66, at 1020 (“[F]inancial support of an institution is a far less personal 
or intimate endorsement of the institution or its principles than the reciting of a pledge or the giving 
of a salute or even than the public display of a slogan or motto on one’s personal property.”).   
 128 See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 852 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 129 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21. 
 130 Id.; see also Klass, supra note 76, at 1118 (making a similar point).  Subsequent cases have 
recognized some challenges to contribution limits, but based on rationales unrelated to the symbolic 
expression rationale (for example, by noting that unduly low limits interfere with the recipient’s 
ability to effectively speak in the election campaign).  See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 
1448–50 (2014) (plurality opinion); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 246–62 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 131 See Klass, supra note 76, at 1122–23 (“Buckley was right to recognize that voluntary payments 
for the speech of others are often interpreted as symbolic acts of support, that they have an (albeit 
limited) expressive content. But . . . our linguistic community does not interpret the payment of 
mandatory assessments in the same way.”). 
 132 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014); see also United States v. 
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982). 
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law passes strict scrutiny;133 but the law would accept their sincere sub-
jective claims that paying money that goes for evil purposes is itself 
sinful.134 
Yet that just reflects how religious exemption cases operate differ-
ently from free speech cases.  Hobby Lobby got a federal Religious  
Freedom Restoration Act135 exemption from a regulation that compelled 
employers to provide employees with certain kinds of medical bene-
fits.136  But it doesn’t follow that such a compulsion violated the Free 
Speech Clause rights of all employers who disapproved of it.  Refusal to 
pay money might be a religious practice, and compelling payments 
might substantially burden religious practice; but it doesn’t follow that 
refusal to pay money is speech, or that compelling the payment of money 
is compelled speech. 
E.  Contributions to Political Parties 
We thus think that the government can compel us to fund others’ 
speech just as permissibly as it can speak directly (with our money).  
This leads to the question: Are there things that the government indeed 
can’t say or support directly, so that even under our view the govern-
ment can’t compel people to subsidize them? 
We mentioned above the only area where the answer is clearly “yes” 
under current doctrine: religious advocacy, which is constrained by the 
Establishment Clause.  The government can’t convey sufficiently reli-
gious views itself137 or selectively give taxpayer funds to have such views 
conveyed.138  Likewise, the government would likely be barred by the 
Establishment Clause from deducting funds from employee paychecks 
and transferring them directly to a religious organization for the same 
forbidden uses. 
Some Justices have suggested that there is a second area where the 
government is barred from spending money: to support a particular po-
litical party.  Justice Black argued in Street that “[p]robably no one 
would suggest” that the First Amendment would let workers be taxed 
“to create a fund to be used in helping certain political parties or groups 
favored by the Government to elect their candidates or promote their 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 133 See, e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 260. 
 134 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777–79. 
 135 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012), invalidated as to state and local laws by City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 136 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780–83. 
 137 See McCreary County. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 878–81 (2005). 
 138 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002); cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995).  The exact rule for when government grants 
can and can’t be spent for religious purposes is complicated, but we won’t focus on it here. 
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controversial causes.”139  Justices Frankfurter and Harlan apparently 
accepted this position.140 
Likewise, in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,141 Justices 
Scalia and Thomas agreed that the government could not “promote  
candidates nominated by the Republican Party,” but denied that “that 
unconstitutionality has anything to do with the First Amendment.”142  
Some courts have suggested that the protection might stem from  
the Guarantee Clause.143  Justices Frankfurter and Harlan thought  
that government spending that creates “risks of governmental self- 
perpetuation . . . might justify the recognition of a Constitutional pro-
tection against the ‘establishment’ of political beliefs.”144 
The Court has never had occasion to decide whether such a doctrine 
exists.  Yet if it does exist, it would have to be narrowly limited to the 
(very rare) government support of particular political parties, political 
candidates, and perhaps (though perhaps not) ballot measures.145 
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 139 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 140 See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 853 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 141 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 142 Id. at 598 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. 
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), Justice Rehnquist argued that a city should have broad latitude to 
choose who may use its property (in that case, a city-owned theater), but “cannot unfairly discrim-
inate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause,” for instance by opening property “to Republicans 
while closing [it] to Democrats,” id. at 572 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Perhaps Justice Scalia 
took a similar view toward supplying funds in Finley as Justice Rehnquist did to opening access 
to physical space — though then one would have to have a theory for why discrimination based on 
party affiliation (say, the government endorsing the Republican candidate) violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause but discrimination based on viewpoint (say, the government endorsing pro-recycling 
messages) does not. 
 143 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1107–08 (E.D. Cal. 2003); Burt 
v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 175 (Or. 1985). 
 144 Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 853 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 145 See Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 625–26, 625 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding advocacy 
of ballot measure constitutional, though advocacy of a particular candidate would be unconstitu-
tional); Cook v. Baca, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1227–29 (D.N.M. 2000) (holding advocacy of ballot 
measure constitutional), aff’d for reasons given below, 12 F. App’x 640, 641 (10th Cir. 2001); Frater-
nal Order of Police v. Montgomery Cty., 132 A.3d 311, 323–27 (Md. 2016) (holding advocacy of 
ballot measure constitutional); Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 915 P.2d 336, 339 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) 
(noting that other authorities have found “support in the constitution for the general proposition 
that, at some threshold level, a public entity must refrain from spending public funds to promote a 
partisan position during an election campaign”); Helen Norton, Campaign Speech Law with a Twist: 
When the Government Is the Speaker, Not the Regulator, 61 EMORY L.J. 209, 256–59 (2011) (argu-
ing for the constitutionality of government speech supporting ballot measure, but not candidate, 
campaigns).  Several cases hold that advocacy of a particular ballot measure is unauthorized under 
state or municipal law.  See, e.g., D.C. Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 11  
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1976); Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 
628, 634 (Mass. 1978); Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Bd. of Educ., 98 A.2d 673, 677–78 (N.J. 
1953) (Brennan, J.).  One case holds that advocacy of a ballot measure violates the Delaware  
Constitution’s provision that “[a]ll elections shall be free and equal.”  Young v. Red Clay Consol. 
Sch. Dist., 122 A.3d 784, 797 (Del. Ch. 2015) (opinion of Laster, V.C.) (alteration in original) (quoting 
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 3); id. at 858–59. 
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Such a doctrine could not support a more general limit on govern-
ment ideological speech, which is commonplace.  Governments are gen-
erally not barred from speaking out for or against legislative actions.146  
Indeed, the President is expressly authorized to recommend legisla-
tion;147 other executive officials, state and federal, routinely do the same; 
so do federal and state judiciaries;148 so do cities and counties.149  Simi-
larly, nothing forbids the government from funding controversial causes 
like Planned Parenthood or crisis pregnancy centers (as some govern-
ments do150) or, if it wished, funding the National Rifle Association or 
the American Civil Liberties Union. 
So if this doctrine exists, it could only limit compelled subsidies to a 
modest extent: if the government can’t itself speak in favor of or fund 
political parties or candidates, the government can’t require people to 
give money that gets spent in support of those parties or candidates.151  
But in our view nothing would prevent the government from compelling 
all of us to pay sums that get spent on an ideological cause — for or 
against abortion, gun regulation, environmentalism, or anything else.  
Because the government can support these causes directly, it can support 
them indirectly.  That some of us might find some of these actions ob-
jectionable is just a reminder that the government can do many objec-
tionable things in our name. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 146 See, e.g., Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 287 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 147 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 2. 
 148 See, e.g., JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY  
7–8, https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2010year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
595C-QB25] (asking Congress to provide more funding and confirm more judges). 
 149 See, e.g., Membership, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, https://www.nlc.org/membership 
[https://perma.cc/7RK6-NA6T] (noting that dues paid by cities help pay for “[f]ederal [a]dvocacy” 
with congressional offices); see also Burkhardt v. Lindsay, 811 F. Supp. 2d 632, 647 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(discussing municipal lobbying). 
 150 See, e.g., PLANNED PARENTHOOD EMPIRE STATE ACTS, TESTIMONY OF PLANNED 
PARENTHOOD EMPIRE STATE ACTS BEFORE THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET HEARING 
ON HEALTH AND MEDICAID 3–4 (2018), https://nyassembly.gov/write/upload/publichearing/ 
000864/001546.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4G2-32VF]; SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV. OF MINOR-
ITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 108TH CONG., REP. ON THE CONTENT OF 
FEDERALLY FUNDED ABSTINENCE-ONLY EDUCATION PROGRAMS 13 (2004), http://spot. 
colorado.edu/~tooley/HenryWaxman.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB7N-QL9J]. 
 151 We’re speaking here of governmental favoritism based on a candidate’s or party’s ideology; 
government-funded programs through which rival parties and candidates can convey their views 
would remain constitutional.  See Libertarian Party of Ind. v. Packard, 741 F.2d 981, 989 (7th Cir. 
1984) (expressly rejecting an Abood-based objection to a public campaign funding program, on the 
grounds that “the funds are not considered to be contributing to the spreading of a political message, 
but rather are advancing an important public interest, the facilitation of ‘public discussion and 
participation in the electoral process’” (citation omitted)).  Some cases reject constitutional chal-
lenges to such programs without discussing Abood-like challenges.  See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television 
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676 (1998) (publicly funded debates); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 90–108 (1976) (public financing of political campaigns); Clark v. Burleigh, 841 P.2d 975, 987–88 
(Cal. 1992) (ballot pamphlets containing candidate statements). 
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All this means that the hypothetical doctrine prohibiting government 
electoral speech could support a narrow limit on agency fees — but the 
effect would be much more like that of Abood than of Janus, and indeed 
more modest than that of Abood.  Unions would need to avoid using 
agency fees to support or oppose particular parties or candidates, or per-
haps particular ballot measures.  But they would remain free to use 
agency fees for collective bargaining (as under Abood152) and even for 
ideological expenditures to promote the same kinds of causes that the 
government can itself promote. 
Thus, for instance, the teachers’ union public relations campaign 
aimed at praising the teaching profession, which Lehnert v. Ferris  
Faculty Ass’n153 held could not be paid for with agency fees,154 should 
have posed no First Amendment problems.  The government can spend 
tax money to promote Teacher Appreciation Week; a union should be 
free to spend agency fees to do the same. 
And of course it remains quite possible that there is no such doctrine 
at all, and that the government is free to support not only causes but 
also candidates, however unfair that may seem.  It remains quite unset-
tled, for instance, whether the First Amendment — or another constitu-
tional provision — restricts governmental drawing of districts designed 
to entrench a particular political party.155  Likewise, it is far from clear 
that there is a broader rule against government speech designed to en-
trench a party.  Perhaps the only constraints on such government speech 
are political, not legal. 
III.  THE EFFECTS OF JANUS 
Janus has been seen as hugely consequential, but we suspect its ef-
fects will be more complex than many anticipate.  For instance, it is not 
at all clear that Janus will have any effect on private labor unions.  
Though Abood’s predecessors, like Street, discussed a First Amendment 
problem with even private labor unions exacting agency fees, they rested 
on a broad conception of the state action doctrine that is out of favor 
today156 — as the Janus majority expressly noted.157  It seems more 
likely that at least some members of the Janus majority would conclude 
that private labor unions that agree with private employers to exact 
agency fees are not regulated by the First Amendment. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 152 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 225–26 (1977). 
 153 500 U.S. 507 (1991). 
 154 Id. at 528–29 (Blackmun, J., writing for four Justices); id. at 559 (Scalia, J., writing for four 
other Justices, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 155 See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926–29 (2018). 
 156 See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens 
United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 849–51 (2012); Joseph E. Slater, Will Labor Law Prompt Con-
servative Justices to Adopt a Radical Theory of State Action?, 96 NEB. L. REV. 62, 68–94 (2017).  
 157 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 n.24. 
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Nor is it clear that Janus will have a major long-term effect on even 
the law governing public sector unions — outside of transition costs — 
because (as we will discuss shortly in section III.A) it seems to preserve 
the possibility of direct payments to unions by the government, and of 
the government speech doctrine more generally.  But Janus will likely 
affect funding for supposedly private speech, such as activities of bar 
associations and university student groups.  And it raises the serious 
possibility of retroactive liability that could make the transition costs 
costly indeed. 
A.  Government Speech vs. Private Speech 
We have argued that governments remain free to directly support 
public sector unions using taxpayer dollars, and that this possibility un-
dercuts the logic of Janus.  After Janus, we suspect that at least some 
jurisdictions will switch to this regime.  But now that Janus has been 
decided, might the Court ride the analogy down the opposite side of the 
slope and conclude that even direct government funding of unions is 
unconstitutional? 
We suppose it’s possible, but we very much doubt it.  Government 
speech and support for speech are ubiquitous, and have been allowed in 
various forms by the Court.  For instance, the Court has unanimously 
concluded that university curriculum choices are likely government 
speech, and taxpayers have no constitutional right to be exempted from 
funding them.158  It has upheld, as government speech, advertising cam-
paigns promoting particular products and denied a constitutional right 
to be exempted from paying assessments to fund them.159  And it has 
unanimously agreed that the government can speak by allowing certain 
monuments in public parks but not others.160 
To the extent there is controversy about the boundaries of the doc-
trine, the controversy is generally over when something stops being gov-
ernment speech and becomes a limited public forum devoted to private 
speech.161  Though the Janus majority did not cite these government 
speech cases, it stressed that it was condemning governmental funding 
of “private speech.”162  We suspect this distinction will remain key. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 158 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234–35 (2000); id. at 
242–43 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 159 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557–67 (2005). 
 160 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470–73 (2009); id. at 485 (Souter, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (agreeing that in the instant case the government’s act was permissible speech). 
 161 See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion); Walker v. Tex. Div., 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2254–63 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting as to the 
majority’s determination that the speech at issue was government speech rather than private 
speech). 
 162 138 S. Ct. at 2460 (opening paragraph of majority); id. at 2464. 
  
196 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 132:171 
We therefore doubt that Janus will have much effect, for example, 
on the series of decisions about agricultural marketing orders that occu-
pied the Court from 1997 to 2005.  The orders involved assessments 
imposed on agricultural producers and used by state or federal govern-
ments to pay for generic promotion (for example, “Buy California Sum-
mer Fruits”).  The Court upheld one such scheme in Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.163 and struck down another in United 
States v. United Foods, Inc.,164 but ultimately held in Johanns v.  
Livestock Marketing Ass’n that these orders were permissible so long as 
they were crafted as government speech.165  This is likely to remain 
accepted, even after Janus; Janus will mostly affect programs construed 
as promoting private speech, such as bar dues and student activities. 
B.  Bar Dues 
Compulsory bar dues have long been treated the same as public em-
ployee union agency fees.  In Lathrop v. Donohue, the Court held that 
lawyers can be required to pay such dues,166 but in Keller v. State Bar 
of California, the Court held that the dues couldn’t be used for political 
advocacy that wasn’t “germane” to “the State’s interest in regulating the 
legal profession and improving the quality of legal services.”167  Keller 
thus tracks the old Abood rule, in which dues could be required but only 
for certain purposes.168 
Now that public employees can’t be required to pay money at all to 
unions, we think the Court will say that lawyers can’t be required to 
pay it to state bars either.  After all, speech by the state bar is as likely 
as speech by unions to “touch fundamental questions of . . . policy,”169 
and more broadly to “have powerful political and civic consequences,”170 
even when it just has to do with regulating the legal profession. 
As with agency fees, we think this would extend a mistake.  The 
First Amendment should not constrain bars’ use of dues. 
Indeed, we think this should be even more clear than with agency 
fees, because it is more logical to see a state bar as an agency of the state 
government, as the California Supreme Court had held in Keller.171  The 
California Bar is an agency expressly authorized by the California  
Constitution172 and, at the time, was run by a Board of Governors that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 163 521 U.S. 457, 467–77 (1997). 
 164 533 U.S. 405, 409–17 (2001). 
 165 544 U.S. 550, 557–59 (2005). 
 166 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961) (plurality opinion). 
 167 496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990). 
 168 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977). 
 169 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2476. 
 170 Id. at 2464. 
 171 Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 767 P.2d 1020, 1025–29 (Cal. 1989), rev’d, 496 U.S. 1. 
 172 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 9. 
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was partly appointed by the state governor and partly elected by state 
bar members.173 
The U.S. Supreme Court, though, concluded that a state bar didn’t 
qualify as a government speaker for First Amendment purposes.  Since 
Keller, the Court has made clear that this determination turned on one 
critical fact: “[T]he state bar’s communicative activities to which the 
plaintiffs objected were not prescribed by law in their general outline 
and not developed under official government supervision.”174  When, on 
the other hand, “the government sets the overall message to be commu-
nicated and approves every word that is disseminated,” it is free to use 
compulsory fees to convey the message, even when the details of the 
message are produced with “assistance from nongovernmental 
sources.”175 
Yet this seems to us an oddly crabbed view of how “official govern-
ment supervision”176 can operate.  Indeed, in the federal government, 
messages are generally set by executive agencies (for example, the  
Department of Agriculture in Johanns), though occasionally by the ju-
diciary or by Congress.  But state governments have a very different 
approach to separation of powers.  Among other things, they often have 
(1) subordinate political subdivisions, including ones in which only par-
ticular kinds of property owners can vote,177 and (2) various government 
agencies that are appointed by a mix of officials from various branches 
of government.178 
Why should these agencies — and, in particular a state bar that is 
governed by a mix of gubernatorial appointees and directors elected by 
California lawyers — be treated differently for First Amendment  
purposes than agencies that have more direct federal analogues?  As 
Johanns itself acknowledges, there is no difference for First Amendment 
purposes between speech funded by an income, property, or sales tax 
and speech funded by a tax levied on a particular occupation.179  Why 
should there be a First Amendment difference based on the way in 
which the supervisors of the speaking organization are appointed or 
elected? 
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 173 Six were gubernatorial appointees, fifteen were elected by state bar members, and one was 
elected by the directors of the Young Lawyers section of the bar.  Keller, 767 P.2d at 1024. 
 174 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 730 (1973). 
 178 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 98, § 19 (medical marijuana licensing commission); MD. 
CONST. art. II, § 21A (gubernatorial salary commission); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 6 (state board of 
higher education); N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, para. 5 (state council on unfunded mandates, empow-
ered to essentially eliminate unfunded state mandates on local subdivisions); N.Y. CONST. art.  
VI, § 2, subdivs. c–d (judicial nominating commission); OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1 (redistricting 
commission). 
 179 See 544 U.S. at 562–63. 
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The oddness of Keller becomes even plainer when one considers that 
some state bars — such as the California bar since 2018 — are governed 
entirely by appointees of elected executive, legislative, and judicial of-
ficeholders.180  That looks to us like an eminently official government 
body, which would thus provide “official government supervision.”181 
We thus think that the restructured California bar should be viewed 
as a fully governmental speaker for First Amendment purposes, and 
thus outside the constraints of Keller.  Yet we would have thought the 
same about the original California bar, which included lawyer-elected 
trustees as well as those appointed by the Governor.182  Perhaps then 
our predictions can’t be trusted, and both partly elected state bars and 
entirely government-official-appointed state bars will be forbidden from 
demanding that lawyers pay any dues. 
C.  Public University Student Government Activity Fees 
In Southworth, the Court unanimously upheld a public university’s 
requirement that students pay a $330 “student activity fee” that would 
then be distributed to student groups through the student govern-
ment.183  The Court concluded that the case was analogous to Abood 
and Keller, but that “[t]he standard of germane speech” applied in those 
cases “is unworkable” when it comes to university student group fund-
ing, given the “vast, unexplored bounds” of the speech that universities 
generally subsidize.184  Because of this, the Court upheld the program 
to the extent that it funded student groups viewpoint-neutrally.185 
But Janus took the opposite approach to the difficulty of identifying 
what speech is “germane” to a government program — Janus held that, 
when such a line is “impossible to draw with precision,”186 the solution 
is to reject all such compulsory funding of speech, not to allow all such 
compulsory funding.  Applying the same logic to student activity fees, 
then, all such fees would need to be held unconstitutional: if “[c]ompel-
ling a person to subsidize the speech of other private speakers raises 
similar First Amendment concerns”187 to compelling speech, then that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 180 E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6010–6013.5 (West Supp. 2018) (providing for five trustees 
appointed by the California Supreme Court, four by the Governor, and four by legislative leaders). 
 181 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.  Nor do we think it should matter whether the messages are “pre-
scribed by law in their general outline.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The presence of a specific legislative 
command may be relevant under other constitutional doctrines, but we see no reason why it should 
matter to the free speech doctrine applied to the states.  
 182 Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 767 P.2d 1020, 1024 (Cal. 1989), rev’d, 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 183 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221–22 (2000). 
 184 Id. at 231–32. 
 185 Id. at 233–34. 
 186 138 S. Ct. at 2481. 
 187 Id. at 2464. 
  
2018] THE SUPREME COURT — COMMENTS 199 
would be as improper when students are compelled to subsidize student 
groups as when employees are compelled to subsidize employee groups. 
Now three of the Justices in Southworth — Justices Stevens, Souter, 
and Breyer — would have upheld student fees for broader reasons than 
did the majority.  They concluded that the dissenting students’ “objec-
tion has less force than it might otherwise carry because the challenged 
fees support a government program that aims to broaden public dis-
course.”188  And they noted that students must pay tuition, which the 
government can use for all sorts of speech that students disapprove of, 
and that “[s]ince uses of tuition payments . . . may fund offensive speech 
far more obviously than the student activity fee does, it is difficult to see 
how the activity fee could present a stronger argument for a refund.”189 
But these arguments do not fit well with the Janus majority.  If re-
quiring people to fund speech they disapprove of is similar to “coerc[ing 
them] into betraying their convictions,” and thus “demeaning,”190 then 
that would happen whether the compelled payment is aimed at 
“broaden[ing] public discourse”191 or at some other purpose.  And while 
universities constantly use tuition funds for speech students may object 
to, likewise the government constantly uses tax revenues for speech tax-
payers may object to.  If this power to use taxes to speak does not in-
clude the power to use much lower compelled agency fees to support 
speech, then it’s hard to see how the power to use tuition payments to 
speak includes the power to use much lower activity fees to support 
speech. 
The three concurring Justices in Southworth also argued that “the 
relationship between the fee payer and the ultimately objectionable ex-
pression is far more attenuated,” because the student fees flow through 
“a distributing agency [the student government] having itself no social, 
political, or ideological character.”192  Likewise, they reasoned that “the 
disbursements, varying from year to year, are as likely as not to fund an 
organization that disputes the very message an individual student finds 
exceptionable.”193 
But these positions are hard to sustain factually.  In practice, at a 
typical public university the student government will indeed have a “so-
cial, political, or ideological character,” and most funded groups will be 
on one side of the political spectrum.  We suspect that at most public 
universities that will be the left side — but even if at some it is the right 
side, there’s little reason to think that all or even most universities will 
be politically balanced. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 188 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 240–41 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 189 Id. at 243. 
 190 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 191 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 240–41 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 192 Id. at 240. 
 193 Id. 
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Perhaps for these reasons, the concurrence’s arguments did not per-
suade any of the other Justices at the time, and they now seem even less 
likely to persuade members of the Janus majority.  Southworth thus 
seems to be in jeopardy. 
Yet public universities that want to keep funding student groups can 
easily avoid this problem, simply by folding the student activity fee into 
the tuition, and then funding the student groups out of that tuition.  The 
Court acknowledged in Southworth that, “[i]f the challenged speech here 
were financed by tuition dollars and the University and its officials were 
responsible for its content, the case might be evaluated on the premise 
that the government itself is the speaker.”194  Johanns strengthens that 
hypothesis to a near certainty. 
And of course this wouldn’t be limited to situations where the uni-
versity necessarily endorses the supported viewpoints: universities rou-
tinely use tuition funds (or tax funds) to support guest speakers (either 
one at a time or on panels aimed at presenting contrasting views), even 
when the university may not agree with all the speakers.  We know of 
no cases suggesting that such funding of university-invited speakers 
would violate the First Amendment rights of taxpayers or tuition payers.  
We likewise think the university is free to pay for speakers invited by 
student groups. 
Nor should there be much of a political barrier to this change.  
Though eye-popping tuition numbers sometimes provoke bad press, stu-
dent activity fees are small; most students won’t care whether they have 
to pay a $30,330 tuition check or $30,000 tuition plus a $330 student 
activity fee.  Student governments might dislike having the university 
more involved in the day-to-day funding, but they should prefer this 
over losing the mandatory fee. 
The universities might prefer for political reasons to have minimal 
interaction with controversial speakers invited by student groups.  But 
universities have — or at least should have — a good deal of experience 
explaining to the public that hosting and even subsidizing a wide range 
of speakers doesn’t mean agreeing with the speakers’ viewpoints.195  
The accounting treatment of student funding seems unlikely to make 
that explanation more or less persuasive. 
So if universities think that subsidizing student groups’ speaker in-
vitations is academically valuable, they will be able to keep doing that.  
Here, even more clearly than as to agency fees, Janus might mean a 
change in accounting but not in substance. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 194 Id. at 229 (majority opinion). 
 195 See Jacob T. Levy (@jtlevy), TWITTER (Apr. 20, 2018, 11:13 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
jtlevy/status/987393758877515776 [https://perma.cc/W96F-V82M]. 
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D.  Union Liability Under Janus 
Finally, Janus may seriously affect unions themselves.  Of course un-
ions will have to change their future behavior, but Janus may also lead 
to liability now for money they collected last year.  In holding unconsti-
tutional the agency fees on which most public employee unions rely,  
Janus makes it likely that they can be sued for substantial damages un-
der the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The case for liability has three key steps.  First, under standard civil 
retroactivity doctrine, Supreme Court decisions supposedly state the 
true law as it has always been, rather than changing the law.  While the 
Court briefly experimented with other more limited forms of retroactiv-
ity,196 black letter law is now that: 
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that 
rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full 
retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, 
regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of 
the rule.197 
This means that courts must treat the involuntary collection of agency 
fees before Janus as unconstitutional. 
Second, unions collecting agency fees are acting “under color” of state 
law,198 thanks to precedents like Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.199  Lugar 
held that private debt collectors could be sued under § 1983 for making 
use of an unconstitutional state statute that allowed the attachment of 
property without due process.200  So long as the private debt collectors 
“invok[ed] the aid of state officials to take advantage of state-created 
attachment procedures,” they were liable for unconstitutional behavior 
under that statute.201 
Union collection of now-unconstitutional agency fees appears analo-
gous.  The state statutes authorizing the collection of agency fees202 are 
unconstitutional state action, just as in Lugar.  And the unions “invoked 
the aid of state officials” to collect those fees, just as in Lugar.203  They 
too will be liable. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 196 See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105–08 (1971); see also Huiyi Chen, Com-
ment, Balancing Implied Fundamental Rights and Reliance Interests: A Framework for Limiting 
the Retroactive Effects of Obergefell in Property Cases, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1417, 1433–36 (2016) 
(tracing doctrine). 
 197 Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). 
 198 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 199 457 U.S. 922 (1982). 
 200 Id. at 934.  
 201 Id. at 942. 
 202 See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(e) (2016), invalidated by Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448.  
 203 In Illinois, for example, as in many states, the state employer will automatically deduct agency 
fees from the employees’ paychecks.  Id. 
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Third, unions do not have the qualified immunity defense that is 
available to government § 1983 defendants.  Private entities are gener-
ally not immune unless they are performing a government function or 
acting on behalf of the government.204  Indeed, in Wyatt v. Cole,205 the 
Court specifically rejected a qualified immunity defense for private par-
ties who had availed themselves of unconstitutional state statutes.206  It 
therefore anticipated and allowed that a private party could simultane-
ously be subject to liability under Lugar without being entitled to any 
countervailing immunity.207  That is the unions’ new bind as well. 
Moreover, since Janus requires nonmembers to “affirmatively con-
sent” to all agency fees (and requires such consent to be “shown by ‘clear 
and compelling’ evidence”),208 the potential claimants are many.  They 
could include all nonmembers who paid agency fees, and might even 
include union members, if the members could show that the threat of 
the unconstitutional nonmember agency fees caused them to join the 
union.  If these suits could be brought as class actions — which is un-
clear209 — then the liability could be substantial. 
The only sure limit on such suits is the statute of limitations.  Under 
§ 1983, the statute of limitations varies by state and follows that state’s 
statute of limitations for personal injury torts.210  In most states this will 
be two or three years.211  Liability for all agency fees for nonmembers 
may thus add up to about 10–20% of a union’s annual revenue.212 
To be sure, this kind of retroactive liability can seem quite unfair, 
especially when the unions were following Supreme Court precedent.213  
And the unions may well have defenses to mitigate that unfairness.  For 
example, they might argue that damages should be sharply reduced be-
cause employees received valuable services in exchange for their agency 
fees.  Or they might argue that a permissible alternative scheme would 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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have led to the same payments, making the damages arguably nomi-
nal.214  Still, the apparent premise of Janus is that agency fees work a 
unique First Amendment injury, and while these First Amendment 
damages must be limited to “plaintiffs’ actual losses,” they can still in-
clude intangible nonmonetary losses.215 
As an alternative, plaintiffs may also be able to pursue claims for 
restitution and unjust enrichment, somewhat analogous both to claims 
for the refund of unconstitutional taxes and to payments under a judicial 
order that has since been reversed.216  The exact boundaries of these 
claims are complex, but they could well lead to some liability. 
Post-Janus suits against unions could also provide the setting for an 
“affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause,”217 or a 
new remedial twist to the Court’s civil retroactivity doctrine.218  Indeed, 
some lower courts have given private parties a good faith defense to 
suits under § 1983, to eliminate the apparent unfairness created by the 
combination of Wyatt and Lugar.219  A few lawsuits brought against 
unions under Harris v. Quinn220 (a precursor to Janus) were dismissed 
by the lower courts on such grounds.221 
But unions still should not be too confident that they will have such 
a defense against Janus suits.  First, this good faith defense has never 
been endorsed by the Supreme Court, and there is little clear authority 
for it.  If one of the cases makes it to the Court, there is no guarantee 
that the Justices will recognize the defense.  And if the Court turns to 
private law analogues for such a defense, it might find that restitution 
and unjust enrichment provide the better analogue. 
Second, these particular suits may present a particularly unsympa-
thetic vehicle to the Court.  In a discussion of union reliance on Abood, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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the Court’s opinion in Janus specifically noted that “public-sector unions 
have been on notice for years regarding this Court’s misgivings about 
Abood”222 and opined that, since 2012, “any public-sector union seeking 
an agency-fee provision in a collective-bargaining agreement must have 
understood that the constitutionality of such a provision was uncer-
tain.”223  So even if such a good faith defense were recognized, the courts 
may well conclude that unions were knowingly gambling on the contin-
ued validity of Abood, and therefore cannot complain about their losses. 
CONCLUSION 
Being forced to pay money to objectionable causes is a fact of life, 
not a First Amendment problem.  But for decades, many people have 
assumed the contrary, and found serious First Amendment burdens in 
such compelled subsidies.  Janus takes that (incorrect) assumption to its 
logical conclusion. 
That may not be the final implication either.  Assuming similar con-
clusions extend to other areas of law, existing arrangements for state bar 
dues and student activity fees, for example, may change as well.  And 
because Janus can lead to surprisingly retroactive liability, universities 
and bar associations should be proactive.  They should consider chang-
ing their methods of collection now, to limit the damage as fast as they 
can. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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